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1 Introduction
Inflation has become a well-entrenched phenomenon in many countries. Somehow it seems that the 
general price level can only rise implying that there is an inflationary bias in society. Consensus has it 
that inflation is likely to impose considerable economic costs (Fischer and Modigliani (1978)). Types 
of costs are, for instance, menu costs, the decrease in real money balances and decreased efficiency 
of the price system 2. There is, however, a lack o f understanding o f the process which systematically 
generates inflation (Davis (1991)).
It is generally thought that the inflationary bias in recent decades has primarily been caused 
by policy mismanagement (see e.g. Guitan (1992)). A number o f diverse and competing theories has 
been put forward to explain why policy makers seem to be unable or unwilling to crush inflation. We 
can distinguish between theories emphasising mechanisms that create higher levels o f inflation and 
theories focusing on mechanisms that create cyclical patterns in inflation. Theories o f the first 
category stress the lack o f the appropriate domestic or international institutional arrangements 
constraining inflationary forces in society (Rogoff (1985), Alogoskoufis (1992)). Some theories in 
the second category emphasise the vulnerability o f decision makers to the inflationary impulses 
stemming from either opportunistic or partisan politics. This would result in fluctuations in rates of 
inflation around election dates.
Since both a high level o f inflation and unexpected fluctuations in this rate are undesirable, it 
would be interesting to seek out those institutions that are able to negate the bias in society as well as 
politically induced cycles. If there are institutional arrangements that seem able to contain 
inflationary tendencies, reforms could be implemented to increase society's efficiency.
Because monetary policy is the most important policy variable determining inflation, 
effective institutional arrangements should constrain the discretionary use o f this policy. Various 
proposals for limiting the discretion o f monetary policy can be found in the literature (See for 
instance Barro and Gordon (1983a) and Rogoff (1985) condensed in Blanchard and Fisher (1989)).
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Two o f these proposals are considered in this paper: an increase in the independence o f the Central 
Bank and becoming a member o f a fixed exchange rate arrangement. We assume that the independent 
central banker and the anchor country in the exchange rate arrangement both pursue a low rate of 
inflation. The independent central banker guarantees that political factors will not influence monetary 
policy. The exchange rate arrangement constrains the use o f domestic policy, even though the Central 
Bank might not be independent. So, in some sense, the membership o f a fixed exchange rate regime 
and the independent Central Bank are substitutes.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence o f institutional arrangements on the rates 
o f inflation in industrialised countries. We pay attention to political influences, in particular the 
effects o f elections and partisan policies, and to effects o f an independent Central Bank and the 
membership o f a fixed-exchange rate mechanism. A novelty o f this paper is that it considers political 
factors and institutions o f monetary policy simultaneously. A second feature is the use o f a more 
precise proxy for the colour o f the government.
The set-up o f this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the inflationary impact of 
discretionary monetary policy and the way in which an independent central banker or membership of 
a fixed-exchange rate regime can contain inflationary tendencies. In section 3 we review the theories 
on the possible influences by political parties. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the empirical evidence 
and Section 6 contains the conclusions.
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Surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on the costs of inflation can be found in Driffill et al. 
(1990) and Dowd (1994).
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2 Central Bank independence, exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy
Room for discretion in policy-making has an important aspect to it; time inconsistency. This means 
that if  policy makers have an incentive to renege on an announced policy, the public will incorporate 
this possibility in their expectations, reducing the credibility and effectiveness o f the policy in 
question. As a result, society is likely to have higher inflation without any gain in output.
In the spirit o f the rational expectations-upheaval, time inconsistency was first highlighted by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). Using a game-theoretic approach they evaluate on the one hand the 
costs o f an anti-inflationary policy, in terms o f production and unemployment, and on the other the 
design o f monetary policy to minimise these costs. Incorporating the "Lucas-critique", they show that 
the ex-ante optimal policy can be sub-optimal ex-post. Rational agents will recognise ex-ante that 
policy makers will face the temptation to "cheat" ex-post, so that the announced policy loses 
credibility. Generally, this lack o f credibility will result in an outcome inferior to a situation where 
policy-makers can commit themselves to maintaining the announced policy. The equilibrium rate of 
inflation will be higher without any reduction in unemployment. A "consistent"-policy is one that 
leads rational agents to believe that the policy maker has no incentive to "cheat" ex-post.
How can we negate the inflationary effects suggested by the various theories? The solutions 
generally suggested are either "internal" or "external". Both approaches aim at reducing the latitude 
for discretionary policy. Internally, discretion could be reduced by increasing the cost o f reneging to 
the policy maker. The costs o f reneging could be increased if  policy makers consider reputational 
effects as is done by Barro and Gordon (1983a,1983b) in the context o f a repeated game. In their 
model they assume that an upward deviation from announced policy leads economic agents to believe 
that this high-inflation policy will be continued for one more period, regardless o f the announced 
policy. This leads policy-makers to abstain from cheating if  the cost in terms o f loss o f established 
reputation is too high. The rate o f time preference and the length o f the punishment period influence
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the final outcome. Therefore, society could achieve lower equilibrium rates o f inflation if  cheating 
were more costly.
Another internal method of reducing the inflationary bias consists o f the appointment o f an 
independent "conservative" central banker. By isolating the Central Bank from direct political 
pressure from each current government, three goals can be achieved. First, there might be a reduction 
of the inflation bias caused by time-inconsistency. Second, pre-electoral manipulation o f monetary 
policy could be reduced. Finally, partisan variability in monetary policy, might be diminished. Rogoff 
(1985) has advocated the appointment o f a "conservative" central banker. Policy would still be set in 
a discretionary fashion and hence "cheating" would still be possible 3. However, a conservative 
central banker would be more concerned with reducing inflation than the rest o f society. As a result, 
such a central banker would generate a lower equilibrium rate o f inflation. Extending Rogoffs 
analysis to a heterogeneous society, W aller (1989,1992) notes that in the presence o f partisan 
disagreement over monetary policy there could still be gains for society as a whole. However, there 
will be partisan disagreement over the appointment o f the central banker 4
An "external" reduction in latitude for discretionary policy could be found in "tying your 
hands" (Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)). Giavazzi and Pagano suggest that monetary discipline could be 
achieved by fixing the domestic currency to a "hard" currency (i.e. German Mark). Policy will be 
more credible because the government is entering an international agreement. Breaking this 
"contract" will result in great political costs. These costs will deter the government from reneging 5. 
This will lend increased credibility to government policy.
It has been argued that society would want to be cheated. Central Bank secrecy would aid the 
effectuation of these "surprises" (Lewis (1991), cf. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)).
Especially in the U.S.A. the constitutionality (i.e. democratic content) of an independent (i.e. not 
elected) monetary policy-body is questioned (Akhtar and Howe (1991:352-367), Belden (1991)). More 
specifically, Federal Reserve behaviour would be aimed at institutional preservation and not at optimi­
sing society's welfare (Auerbach (1991)).
This can also be considered a form of bonding. In this case, the government arrives at a consistent 
solution by posting a bond that penalizes it for not carrying out the first best outcome. See e.g. 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989:599-600)
4
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3 Political factors
3.1 Introduction
It has been argued that the preferences of political parties and their concern regarding re-election 
generate "political business cycles" (PBC's) in both output and inflation. The theories dealing with 
electoral influences on policy trace their origins in the writings of Kalecki and Schumpeter (Rogoff 
(1988):53).
Two main approaches have evolved in the more general field of polical economy. The first 
approach views political parties as being only office motivated, while the second group sees them as 
trying to implement some kind of ideologically motivated program 6. Within these approaches a 
distinction is made between models assuming "naive voters" and "sophisticated voters" 7. We will 
cover these approaches in turn. At this point we should make some qualifying remarks with regard to 
the analysis. The theories examined assume, explicitly or implicitly, a bipolar political spectrum.
Thus the complications of coalitions are ignored. Regretfully, we will follow this limited analysis. 
Another remark is that the "naive voter" category assumes a permanently exploitable Phillips-curve 
trade-off. Although internally consistent, since agents are unsophisticated in both the political and the 
economic arena, this line of research has suffered from the demise of the stationarity of the Phillips- 
curve. Another important insight, not incorporated in these models, is that agents will have some 
form of rationality. Therefore, the emphasis will be on the more recent theories incorporating rational 
voter behaviour. We simplify with regard to the control over monetary policy and assume that the 
elected government is able to determine monetary policy. Naturally, this is the case if the elected 
government is the sole policy maker, but even if monetary policy is determined by another, 
independent institution, extensive influence is possible8.
Preferences of the (median) voter or the parties representing him are taken as a given. See Cohen 
(1988) for an exposition on shifting preferences (eg. increased conservatism in the last decade).
The two categories could also be termed backward- and forward-looking (Ellis and Thoma (1991)). 
See Section 3 for the role of an independent central bank. See Havrilesky (1988) for executive and 
Grier (1991) for legislative influence on monetary policy.
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3.2.1 Nordhaus' legacy
In his seminal article on PBC's, Nordhaus (1975) argues that politicians are mainly interested in re­
election. In his model, votes for the incumbent party are related negatively to inflation and 
unemployment, and positively to growth. Thus the incumbent has an incentive to boost output before 
an election coupled with a corrective contraction after the elections. This process results in long-term 
cycles in both real variables (GNP-growth and employment) and monetary variables (inflation). 
Empirical evidence of the existence of electoral budget cycles seems rather thin9. For the United 
States only the Nixon administration seems to have succumbed to the temptation of a political 
monetary cycle.
3.2.2 The rational extension
The application of game theory to macroeconomics has led to a restatement of the PBC-approach 
propagated by Nordhaus (1975) in a rational expectations framework. This extension is formulated 
by, for instance, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990).
The models in these papers share two basic ingredients. Firstly, different governments are 
characterised by different degrees of competency. Secondly, due to informational asymmetry, the 
government is better informed than the voters about its own level of competence. The models share 
the property that the incumbent government has an incentive to "signal" its competence by engaging 
in pre-electoral manipulations of policy instruments.
We will discuss Rogoff and Sibert's (1988) model as an example of these asymmetric 
information models 10. In this model, competent governments are able to produce more public goods 
for given fiscal revenues than incompetent ones. Voters prefer competent governments to
3.2 Opportunistic politicians
Empirical evidence rejecting the PBC is found in Alesina (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992), Allen 
and McCrickard (1991), Alt and Chrystal (1983), Beck (1982), Grier (1989), Havrilesky (1987), Hibbs 
(1977,1987) and Laney and Willett (1983). Evidence in favour of the PBC can be found in Frey and 
Schneider (1978) - who combine 'opportunistic' and 'partisan' effects - or Haynes and Stone (1989).
In Rogoff (1990) the same definition of competence is used while in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), 
competency is referred to as the ability to forecast. In the former model information is conveyed
9
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incompetent ones. Signalling would proceed along the following lines: incumbents would reduce 
taxes and/or increase spending before elections, to appear competent. Pre-electoral deficits are 
monetized, but the voters notice the effects of the monetization on inflation or on real wealth only 
after the election. Although voters are rational and aware of the government's incentives, the lag in 
observation creates the latitude for signalling, financed with a pre-electoral deficit.
Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1992) draw two important conclusions from these models. 
Firstly, because of the assumption of asymmetric information, opportunistic cycles can survive in 
rational models. In contrast to the cycles in Nordhaus' earlier work, however, the observed cycles 
would not occur in GDP or employment; rational agents cannot be fooled repeatedly in the long run. 
Incumbents could, however, engage in short-run manipulation of policy instruments around elections. 
Therefore cycles would be found in short-term instruments like money-growth and 
transfers.Secondly, rational behaviour does not preclude backward-looking voting behaviour. If 
competence can only be evaluated on the basis of some kind of "performance record", rational voting 
will be based on achieved policy goals and thus will be backward-looking.
Empirical evidence on the manipulation of policy instruments is mixed. It is, however, 
stronger than the evidence in favour of Nordhaus's hypothesis n .
3.3 The partisan approach
3.3.1 Hibbs' groundwork
Hibbs (1977,1987) disagrees with the opportunistic-approach, where party policy converges to court 
the median voter. In his view, parties are ideologically identifiable, for instance in "Left-wing" = L 
and "Right-wing" = R. L-parties are relatively more concerned about unemployment than about 
inflation, while R-parties have opposite priorities. Voters choose the parties that best represent their 
objective economic interest and subjective preferences. Voting is based on past performance and thus 
naive. The implication of backward-looking behaviour and differing party objectives is that economic
through inter-temporal substitution of government investment and consumption and in the latter
competency is signalled through monetary growth rates.
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policy only changes when the party in power is replaced. Monetary policy will be tighter under 
inflation-averse R-parties. This would lead to lower rates of inflation under R-parties than under L- 
parties. Therefore, a change of government from an L-party to an R-party leads to a decrease in the 
rate of inflation. Another implication is that incumbent parties do not try to "buy" their re-election 
through manipulation of economic performance. Cycles would not be linked to elections.
3.3.2 Election uncertainty
The idea, put forward by Hibbs, that parties differ in their ideological platform is intuitively 
appealing. However, the assumption that voting is based on past performance is not. The 
dissatisfaction with simplistic backward-looking voting behaviour led to the development of partisan 
models with "sophisticated" voters. The most important model in this line of research is a model 
proposed by Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Sachs (1988), focusing on the uncertainty of electoral 
outcomes. Like Hibbs, they assume a left- and a right-wing party, with different objective functions. 
However, because voters are perfectly informed about the policy preferences of the two parties they 
can calculate the rate of monetary expansion chosen by each party, leading to perfect -and therefore 
correct- expectations in non-election periods. Since there is no surprise inflation, output will be at the 
level determined by the market. In election periods, however, there is uncertainty as to which party 
will be elected. Rational voters can calculate the expected rate of monetary expansion. They calculate 
this rate as a weighted average, using the respective election victory probabilities, of the discretionary 
rates chosen by each party in case of election. After an election it becomes clear which rate of 
monetary expansion will prevail but there will be surprise inflation or deflation because the actual 
rate of monetary growth will differ from the expected rate. This will lead to a recession in the first 
half of an R-administration because the actual rate of monetary expansion will fall short of the 
expected rate, while the reverse holds for an L-administration. The larger the difference in relative 
weights assigned by the parties to the two targets, the larger the upward or downward deviation from 
the output growth trend. Another implication of the uncertainty of the electoral outcome is that the
11 Tentative support for fiscal transfers can be found in Alesina (1988) and Hibbs (1987). Evidence
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more surprising the electoral result, the greater the difference between the expected and the actual 
money growth will be. This surprise inflation (deflation) leads to a bigger deviation of output growth 
from its trend.
3.4 Conclusion
What do the reviewed theories predict for the behaviour of output and inflation? table a presents a 
summary of the various theories.
Table A Models of electoral cycles
Party Motivation ® Opportunistic Ideological/Partisan
Voter Behaviour ^
Naive
Nordhaus (1975,1989): All incumbents 
will stimulate prior to elections and 
shift focus back to price stability 
after elections. This will lead to 
consistent cycles in output and 
inflation, with output rising before 
and inflation rising after or just 
before elections.
Hibbs (1977, 1987): Liberal and con­
servative parties choose different 
output-inflation trade offs. Thus 
there will be significant differences 
in actual inflation levels between 
governments of a different 
"colour". No cyclical pattern 
around elections.
Sophisticated
Cukierman-Meltzer (1986) Rogoff-Sibert 
(1988) Rogoff (1990): Short-run mani­
pulation of policy instruments. 
Informational asymmetry gives go­
vernments an incentive to "signal" 
their competence. No consistent 
cycles in output, but manipulation 
of policy-instruments around electi­
ons, and thus a rise in inflation after 
an election
Alesina (1989) Alesina-Sachs (1988) Ha- 
vrilesky (1987): Voters understand 
ideological differences but due to 
electoral uncertainty different 
patterns of money-growth prevail. 
Decline in output and actual infla­
tion if government changes from 
Left to Right, while the reverse 
holds for a switch from Right to 
Left.
Ex-ante, the model proposed by Nordhaus does not seem very convincing. It relies on predict-
able "surprise", which is a contradictio in terminis. It is therefore not surprising that it has not
received very strong empirical support (see note 9). Hibbs' model predicts a lack of cycles around
elections but different levels of inflation between governments of a different colour because of
different objectives. Both these models rest on the assumption that agents are naive. The sophisti-
identifying a monetary cycle is presented in Grier (1989).
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cated extensions, reviewed in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 try to incorporate rational agents in the 
models. Their results are based on informational asymmetry or election uncertainty. The 
opportunistic model predicts manipulation of policy instruments around election dates, which might 
give rise to an increase in inflation after an election. The partisan model expects significant 
differences in inflation between governments of a different "colour".
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4 Empirical Evidence: specification and variables
We test the theories presented in the previous sections by means of the following relation for the rate 
of inflation.
DPt = b 0 „ + hBANK,, + b 2 EXMECHt + b 3 ELECTlt + b 4COLtl + b 5 A / ,  + A  + frOU, + e .
In this model eit is an independently distributed disturbance term. A short description of the variables 
is given in table b while a more thorough description can be found in the following sections. The 
percentage change in world price index, APtW and the dummy for the oil price shocks, Oilt are 
included to control for exogenous factors. To take account of the persistence of inflation APit is added 
with a one period lag. table b presents the theoretical signs of the coefficients.
Table B The variables and their expected signs
Variable Definition Assumption Tested Sign
BANK Proxy for the relative degree of Central Bank 
independence based on legal texts.
An independent Central Banker is able and 
inclined to pursue less inflationary policies.
-
EXMECH Proxy for the commitment to the exchange rate 
arrangement.
A fixed exchange-rate mechanism is associated 
with lower inflation.
+
ELECT Dummy for elections. Elections cause inflationary manipulation of 
policy.
+
COL Proxy for the "colour" of the government. Left-wing governments are inclined to choose 
higher rates of monetary growth.
+
OIL Dummy for oil-shocks. A rise in oil-prices has an inflationary effect. +
A Pt Percentage change in the Consumer Price Index12
--- —
APt-i See Pt . Rates of inflation show persistence. +
APW Percentage change in the world price index. World inflation relates positively to domestic 
inflation.
+
The signs of the coefficients of variables representing institutional arrangements (BANK, EXMECH, 
ELECT and COL) follow from their construction. Before presenting the empirical results we turn to a 
discussion of the construction of these central variables.
12 Where the subscripts i and t denote that the particular occurrence concern the ith country at time t. The 
annual percentage rates were computed from indices given in various issues of the International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary Fund.
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4.1 The independence of the Central Bank
A host of factors determines the degree of independence of the Central Bank. We can divide these 
factors into formal and informal influences.
Formalfactors include, for instance, the sources of appointment of the governors of the bank 
or methods for reaching decisions 13. Previous research has almost exclusively dealt with interna­
tional comparisons of bank laws 14. Most indices are constructed in a similar fashion. Bank laws are 
examined for a limited number of relatively precise legal characteristics such as control over policy 
or appointment of top-level officials. Except for Cukierman's index (Cukierman (1992)) the reviewed 
indices were computed for approximately the last decade only. It is surprising that there is 
disagreement even over such a short time-span and employing such clear data 15. The disparities 
could be caused by either differing interpretations of the sometimes ambiguously stated bank laws or 
by dissimilarities in the construction of the various indices (Eijffinger and Schaling (1992)).
The degree of independence of the Central Bank is not solely based on its formal or legal 
status. Informalfactors such as the personality of key figures involved, informal arrangements 
between the government and the monetary authority and cultural habits have a pronounced effect on 
actual independence 16. However, these factors are less easily quantifiable. Even when the law is 
quite explicit, actual practice can deviate substantially because tradition has it that way 17.
15
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Other important institutionalised factors are the statutory goals, the ownership-structure of the bank, 
formal liaisons or interchange of staff with the finance ministry and the reporting requirements or 
accountability to Parliament or Congress (Banaian, Laney and Willett (1983)).
A short-list should certainly include the following: Banaian, Laney and Willett (1983), Parkin (1987), 
Alesina (1988), Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), 
Cukierman (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) and Eijffinger,van Roij and Schaling (1996).
See Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) or Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) for a comparison.
Havrilesky and others have shown that, for instance, not only the partisan affiliation but also the career 
and background characteristics of monetary policy makers in the U.S., including those who are not 
politically appointed, have significant effects on their monetary policy preferences. Havrilesky (1990), 
Havrilesky and Gildea (1992). Not so Belden (1991).
The Dutch situation is a case-in-point. Formally, the minister of finance can issue directives to the Central 
Bank. However, this has never happened nor is it deemed likely to happen (See also Eijffinger and de 
Haan (1996). Cukierman (1992:386-391) proposes a questionnaire-method. Unfortunately this method 
has yet to produce a consistent index.
12
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Rendering a balanced judgement on the "legal" indices necessitates detailed knowledge of the 
various bank laws. Since the evaluation of these indices is not our concern, we chose an index very 
simple criterion: the period covered. Since Cukierman (1992) is the only author who provides data 
for the whole post-war era we employ his weighted index of legal independence in the empirical test.
4.2 Exchange rate mechanisms
We constructed the variable EXMECH to capture commitment to fix the domestic exchange rate to 
an anchor currency. This variable means to capture two aspects of commitment; on the one hand the 
success in keeping the exchange rate stable and on the other the cost of stability in terms of reserves. 
Thus we define the variable as
y  / Ett - Et-1 /
EXMECH -  t=1 Ett-1
where Elt is the exchange rate termed in local currency against the anchor currency, Rt the stock of 
reserves and n  is set at 4 quarters 18. The quarterly exchange rate, Eit, is taken from International 
Financial Statistics from the IMF. To determine the anchor country we consulted the IMF Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 19. We did not use the IMF 
classification because it may depend to a certain extent on wishful thinking 20. If the exchange rate is 
relatively stable the EXMECH-variable will approach 0. A rise in EXMECH is tempered by the 
amount of reserves a country is willing to spend defending its currency. Higher values, truncated at 
the maximum of the rest of the sample, correspond with more unstable exchange rates. To capture the 
sluggishness of reputation building it is added with a one period lag.
Countries with floating currencies do not have an anchor currency. Therefore we calibrated their score 
at the maximum of the rest of the sample. Other specifications in the same vein were computed but did 
not give qualitatively different results
The determination of anchor currencies follows directly from the IMF Annual Report but is available 
on request.
See Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994: 52, note 9).
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4.3 Political variables.
To consider electoral effects we include the dummy-variable ELECTit. It equals 1 in a year in which 
an election is held in the first or second quarter. If an election is held in the latter half of the year, the 
following year is coded as 1. The slightly lagged definition of this variable captures the sluggishness 
of rates of inflation in response to any policy manipulation.
A number of problems are encountered in the definition of the "colour" of the government 
(COL-variable). The first problem is that a clear definition of Left/Liberal/Democratic or 
Right/Conservative/Republican cannot be given. This problem would become even more knotty, if 
the definition were to be valid across countries. So, even if a preference-function could be extracted 
from a political party's proclaimed goals, cross-country comparison would be difficult. Another 
problem is that preferences of political parties seem highly unstable. Changes in perceived popularity 
can have pronounced effects on politicians' stated policy goals 21.
Considering these difficulties, previous research has categorised governments into Left- and 
Right-wing categories. Alesina and Roubini (1992:685-687) give an easily accessible categorisation 
used by most authors in this line of research 22. Governments are classified as either left- or right- 
wing. However, Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1993) present a more precise categorisation. The 
ideological complexion of the government is ranked on a scale of 1 to 5. Strong Right-wing 
governments are assigned a value of 1 while higher values represent first weaker right-wing and then 
increasingly left-wing governments. The classification not only measures the colour but weighs it to 
reflect the degree to which a government can attain it’s goals. We will employ this classification for 
the coding of the COL-variable in the test23.
"...it's a theory (Monetarism) I have never adhered to...", (M. Thatcher, BBC-interview, mid 1984) after 
it became clear that her Monetarist-policies were playing havoc with the British economy, causing high 
inflation and all time lows in popularity polls.
This categorisation is also presented in Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1992). See Banks (1987) and Alt 
and Chrystal (1983) for an exposition on the matter of categorising parties.
In the classification of Woldendorp et al the United States are not included since the constitutional 
system is a presidential one. After conferring with professor Keman we allotted a 2.5 to a Republican 
President and 3.5 for a Democrat.
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4.4 Concluding remarks
There are a number of difficulties that arise in this line of empirical research, in which institutions 
and policy makers' behaviour are modelled 24. Some problems concern the exact definition of the 
variables. We already dealt with these difficulties in the previous sub-sections. Another problem is 
the low variance of these variables. Institutional changes or even changes of governments are 
relatively infrequent events. Thus, the researcher has few useful observations, even if he takes a 
relatively long sample-period. As a consequence there is a lack of degrees of freedom. A related 
problem is that some proxies are relatively static, leading to a singular matrix in regression analysis. 
For instance, the degree of independence of the Bundesbank as proxied by its legal independence has 
not changed since 1949 (Cukierman (1992)). To counter the problem caused by static Central Bank 
independence and to enlarge the number of degrees of freedom we employ pooled time-series and 
cross-national analyses. This alleviates the singular matrix difficulties caused by relatively static 
structural factors.
The sample period runs from 1959 to 1990 and we consider the following 18 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
See Lombra and Kaufman (1992) for a more extensive exposition on this issue.
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5 Empirical results
The results for the pooled time-series are shown in table c. An independent central bank and fixed 
exchange rates appear to have had a disinflationary effect during the period 1959-1990 (table c, 
column one). The full model explains approximately three-quarters of the variance, indicating a 
reasonable fit. The covariance between the variables is within reasonable limits (See Appendix).
Table C Model results on pooled time-series (1959-1990)
Variable 1959-1990 1959-1972 1973-1990 Bankiow Bankhigh Inflationiow Inflationhigh
BANK -2.112 -.872 -3.062 4.630 -4.206 -1.718 -0.528
(-3.659) (-1.255) (-3.609) (2.259) (-3.834) (-3.155) (-0.356)
EXMECH .007 .006 -.012 -.008 .182 0.135 0.049
(2.049) (1.999) (-.095) (-.363) (1.654) (0.766) (1.408)
ELECT .310 .277 .269 .606 -.045 0.071 0.304
(1.568) (1.130) (.942) (1.957) (-.195) (0.306) (1.035)
COL .052 .051 .078 .043 .137 -0.003 0.097
(0.913) (.719) (.969) (.509) (1.853) (-0.034) (1.213)
DPt-i .587 .349 .649 .525 .614 0.523 0.478
(21.863) (6.748) (19.265) (13.297) (16.116) (11.941) (12.775)
DPW .454 .704 .466 .616 .333 0.359 0.750
(11.675) (8.110) (9.292) (10.173) (7.013) (7.510) (11.857)
OIL 1.366 --- 1.575 1.355 1.295 1.233 0.638
(3.541) --- (3.694) (2.190) (2.912) (2.707) (1.106)
Constant .536 .401 .068 -1.279 1.959 0.930 -0.364
(1.673) (.893) (.134) (-1.447) (3.348) (2.526) (-0.579)
R Square .760 .438 .769 .756 .792 .711 .792
Adj. R 
Square
.757 .424 .764 .750 .787 .703 .787
Stand. Err. 2.074 1.670 2.256 2.291 1.722 1.704 2.181
The numbers not in parentheses denote the magnitude o f the coefficients while the numbers in parentheses give the t-statistic.
In order to investigate the robustness of the result we have distinguished some sub-periods 
and sub-groups of countries25. The sub-periods are the Bretton Woods period - a period characterised
Another complication which we investigated, but for which we will not present the results here, is that 
in our specification short- and long-run influences are thrown together. If we purge the equation of all 
short-run influences (i.e. p=f(BANK,COL) and use 5 or 10 year averages the results do not differ
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by a global fixed exchange rates system - and the post Bretton Woods period, characterised by 
flexible exchange rates between the most important currencies. The EXMECH variable has a 
significant inflation-reducing influence during the Bretton Woods period (table c, column two), 
whereas the Bank variable has this role during the post-Bretton Woods period (table c, column 
three)26. This suggests that the independence of the central bank has become more important and that 
there is a trade-off between the autonomy of the central bank and the exchange rate system (See 
below).
The countries were divided into two subgroups of equal size on the basis of the following 
criteria: One equal split was made between those countries that have an independent central bank 
versus countries with a relative dependent central bank. The other grouping was between countries 
with high versus those with low inflation rates. It appears that the BANK variable has the wrong sign 
in the group of countries with a dependent central bank. This variable is highly significant and 
correctly signed in the group of countries with an independent central bank (table c, columns four and 
five, respectively). These results suggests that there is a threshold level of independence above which
27the autonomy of the Central Bank becomes effective . The results for the groups of high and low 
inflation rate countries (table c, columns six and seven) show that the independence of the central 
bank is only effective in countries with a low inflation rate. The other institutional variables do not 
have any significant influence in these two subgroups.
A conclusion from Section 2 was that rates of inflation would probably be lower under an 
unaccommodative fixed exchange-rate mechanism than under flexible rates. However the coefficients 
for the EXMECH variable have mixed signs. During the full period and the Bretton-Woods period 
the sign is correct and significant but the coefficient becomes insignificant in the second sub-period.
significantly from those presented: BANK still has a significant negative influence on inflation and the 
coefficient of COL is insignificant.
See also de Haan en Sturm (1992).
We also tested for interaction between central bank independence and the exchange rate commitment 
by including an interaction term. This proved to be an unfruitful approach, probably due to the scaling 
of the two proxies. However rescaling still left the commitment variable insignificantly different from 
zero. Heylen and van Poeck (1996) stress the importance of interaction but estimate a 'blanket'
26
27
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Maybe the fact that the exchange rate commitment does not reduce inflation in a significant way 
during every sub-period can be ascribed to the way the external commitment is measured. We 
therefore direct part of our future research to the measurement of external commitment.
Table 2 surmised the expected results yielded by the various theories concerning electoral 
influences reviewed in Section 3. Recapitulating and simplifying, the "opportunistic"-approach 
predicted significant effects around elections but no significant differences between parties28. There 
is a slight, positive effect in election years especially in countries with relatively dependent Central 
Banks (See the fourth column). Models of the "partisan"-approach predict significant differences in 
rates of inflation under left- and right-wing governments. In contrast with previous research, the 
variable capturing this effect, COL, does not support the theory 29. Introducing a lag in the influence 
of the political color of the government does not change this. The variable does appear to be almost 
significant for the countries with a relatively independent Central Bank (column five). This suggests 
that in countries with a dependent Central Bank political influences are "channelled" through the 
Central Bank whereas in countries with an independent Central Bank this channel is cut off and 
therefore the political influences become a factor of their own 30. This suggestion is supported by the 
increased covariance between the COL and the BANK variable: from 0.074 in the first sub-section to 
0.245 in the second sub-section..
A conclusion from the results presented in table c is that there seems to be a trade off 
between the various institutional arrangements. In particular, the results of the Bretton Woods period 
versus the post Bretton Woods period suggest a trade-off between fixed exchange rates and the 
independence of the central bank, whereas the subdivision of high and low central bank independence
interaction term; i.e. they assume that the interaction is equally strong for all included explanatory 
variables.
As noted, the theories assume a bipolar system. To investigate if the neglect of the dynamics of 
coalitions is warranted we split the sample in countries with two-party versus a multi-party tableau; The 
results did not really differ between the groups.
See for instance Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1992). Employing their proxy for the ‘colour’ of the 
government in the model of the first column gives a coefficient value of 0.43 with a -significant- t-value 
of 2.26. This implies that a left-wing government might pursue more expansionary policies.
28
29
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suggest a trade off between the independence of the central bank and the political variables. In order 
to have a direct test of these trade offs, two variables have been added to the list of explanatory 
variables, namely CROS 1 and CROS 2. These terms are constructed by dividing respectively COL 
and EXMECH by BANK. We expect the influence of CROS1 to be positive due to the following: the 
direct signs of COL and BANK are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. By 
construction the value of CROS 1 becomes smaller when BANK becomes larger, i.e. the central bank 
becomes more independent. Thus, if the sign of CROS 1 is positive a left wing government is more 
inflationary but will be curbed by the Central bank. We constructed CROS 2 to capture any 
interaction between the commitment to an exchange rate target and the independence of the central 
bank. An independent central bank could, for instance, very well be in favour of exchange rate 
commitments. Another possible interaction channel is that given a strong commitment to an exchange 
rate target the central bank is left with less leeway in monetary policy. It is therefore likely that the 
influence of central bank independence will be lower under relatively more fixed exchange rate 
arrangements.
The resulting relation has been estimated for all (sub)groups and (sub)periods mentioned in 
table c. For each regression the variable with the least significant coefficient has been deleted until all 
remaining coefficients are significant. The results are presented in table d.
Analogously to the interaction term between the exchange rate commitment and the central bank 
independence, we estimated a model with an interaction term between the colour of the government and 
the degree of central bank independence. Again this approach was unfruitful.
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Table D Model results after stepwise deletion on pooled time-series (1959-1990)
Variable 1959-1990 1959-1972 1973-1990 Banklow Bankhigh Inflationlow Inflationhigh
BANK -2.113
(-3.662)
--- -3.080
(-3.680)
4.774
(2.352)
--- -1.743
(-3.235)
---
EXMECH .064
(1.975)
.056
(2.049)
--- --- .212
(1.928)
--- ---
ELECT --- --- --- .598
(1.939)
--- --- ---
COL --- --- --- --- -.741
(-3.683)
--- ---
CROS 1 --- --- --- --- .396
(4.082)
--- ---
DPt-1 .586 .353 .653 .529 .609 .521 .472
(21.870) (6.995) (19.956) (14.043) (16.037) (11.972) (13.509)
£
PA .457 .704 .472 .613 .360 .351 .771
(11.736) (8.154) (9.626) (10.251) (7.423) (7.665) (14.302)
OIL 1.382 --- 1.550 1.327 1.209 1.244 ---
(3.578) (3.673) (2.160) (2.725) (2.744)
Constant .729 .231 .290 -1.426 -.120 1.049 -.183
(2.454) (.772) (.613) (-2.429) (-.475) (3.321) (-.685)
R Square .758 .430 .773 .755 .793 .710 .794
Adj. R 
Square
.756 .423 .770 .751 .789 .706 .792
Stand. Err. 2.076 1.672 2.246 2.285 1.715 1.697 2.177
The numbers not in parentheses denote the magnitude o f the coefficients while the numbers in parentheses give the t-statistic.
For most (sub)groups and (sub)periods the results of the equations with the cross-terms (table d) 
reaffirm the conclusions derived from table c. The only cross term that appears to be significant is 
CROS 1 in the relation of countries with a highly independent central bank (table d, column five). In 
this relation the following institutional factors are significant: EXMECH, COL (wrongly signed), and 
CROS 1. The significance of the coefficient of CROS 1 suggests that there is a trade off between the 
colour of the government and the independence of the central bank. The direct effect of central bank 
independence becomes insignificant and that of the colour of the government becomes significant but 
wrongly signed. Hence, chances are that these results originate from the resulting multicollinearity 
between BANK, COL, and CROS 1. We, therefore, stick to the results of table c and conclude that in
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the case of countries with an independent central bank, inflation is lower than with a dependent one 
and that in these countries there is a tendency that left-wing governments increase inflation. No 
plausible direct cross effect is significant and thus these results once again show robustness of the 
estimations presented in table c 32.
Finally, we estimated the model for each country individually. These regressions confirm our 
choice of pooled estimation. For most countries only world inflation and lagged inflation were 
significant. The within-country variation of the other variables is not large enough to give a 
meaningful estimate. However, for some countries some variables did remain significant. After 
stepwise deletion of the least significant variables some institutional effects remain for two countries 
(See table e).
Table E Institutional influences in individual countries (1959-1990)
Variable Australia Italy
EXMECH --- .104
(2.630)
ELECT --- 1.769
(2.012)
COL .451 ---
(2.662)
DPt-i .454 .485
(4.363) (6.145)
DPW .611 1.198
(4.614) (7.594)
Constant -.637 -2.627
(-.947) (-3.136)
R Square .859 .912
Adj. R Square .844 .899
Stand. Err. 1.638 2.030
The numbers not in parentheses denote the magnitude o f the 
coefficients while the numbers in parentheses give the t-statistic.
The robustness is reaffirmed by estimates for the various sub-samples in Table 3 without the countries of 
the two major anchor currencies, the US Dollar and the German Mark. These regressions did not change 
the result drastically.
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For Australia the variable COL remains significant (table e,column one). This is due to the 
terrible inflationary record of the Australian Labour Party. For Italy the variable EXMECH and 
ELECT are significant (table e, column two ). The fact that ELECT remains significant whereas COL 
is insignificant seems plausible. After World War II Italy has seen many changes in governments and 
there were many elections. However, during our sample period all governments were dominated by 
the same parties. The significant influence of the exchange rate mechanism suggests that the Italian 
membership of fixed-exchange-rate- regimes - the Bretton Woods system, the Snake and European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism - has been instrumental for reducing inflation.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the influence of institutional arrangements on inflation in 18 
OECD countries during 1959-1990. The institutional factors considered are the degree of 
independence of the Central Bank, the membership of a fixed-exchange rate arrangement and 
political variables, such as elections and partisan policies. The regression appeared to explain about 
three-quarters of the variance of the rate of inflation. An independent Central Bank appears to 
significantly reduce the level of the rate of inflation. A more detailed analysis suggest that there is a 
threshold level of independence above which the independence of the Central Bank becomes 
effective. It was also suggested that in countries with a dependent Central Bank political influences 
are channelled through the bank while this channel is blocked in countries with a more independent 
Central Bank. In some cases we found an indication that the membership of a fixed exchange rate 
regime reduces inflation rates. In countries with a dependent central bank after election years political 
factors increase the rate of inflation. In this study a new proxy for measuring the ideological colour of 
the government is employed. This proxy is more precise then the proxy published in Alesina, Cohen 
and Roubini (1992) and used in most previous studies. It appears that ideological motives have no 
influence on inflation whereas there are effects in studies using the 'Alesina'-proxy.
For future research we suggest the development of a measure that represents the degree of 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime. Another direction that might be fruitful is to investigate 
whether there is a critical level at which Central Bank independence and/or the commitment to a 
fixed exchange rate mechanism becomes effective in reducing inflation. Finally, an interesting 
avenue, which has not been explored here or in any other literature, is in what way these theories 
would be applicable to non- or newly industrialising countries.
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Appendix
Table F Correlation of variables (1959-1990)
DPt DPt-i DPW BANK COL ELECT EXMECH OIL
pi<l 1.000 .817 .717 -.229 .105 .015 -.046 .261
pi<l 1.000 .592 -.232 .093 -.093 -.078 .078
DPW 1.000 -.024 .096 .005 -.130 .378
BANK 1.000 .029 -.011 -.074 -.011
COL 1.000 .012 -.048 .032
ELECT 1.000 -.026 .032
EXMECH 1.000 -.043
OIL 1.000
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